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he European Union thinks of 
itself as a ‘soft power’, which is 
defined by Joseph Nye as the 
“ability to get what you want through 
attraction rather than through coercion” 
and which can “be cultivated through 
relations with allies, economic 
assistance, and cultural exchanges.”
1 
Few would think that Russia has ‘soft 
power’ ambitions, but the truth is that 
Russia has started to invest in the 
infrastructure of a soft power.  
The moment of truth for Russia came 
with the ‘Orange Revolution’ in 
Ukraine, when the power of ideas was 
revealed by events. Konstantin 
Kosachev, Chairman of the foreign 
affairs committee of the Russian Duma 
was puzzled by such developments. For 
him, “the situation is absurd” when 
post-Soviet states enjoy more benefits 
from cooperating with Russia and still 
they want to “enter into the straitjacket 
of European institutions and to fall 
under the diktat of Brussels.”
2 This 
happens because Russia “cannot explain 
the purpose of its presence in the post-
Soviet Union… The West is doing this 
under the banner of democratisation, 
and one gets the impression we are 
doing it only for the sake of ourselves… 
Our activeness is following too openly 
Russian interests. This is patriotic but 
not competitive.”
3 Thus, Russia realised 
that its policy suffers from an 
‘ideological emptiness’.
4 This had to be 
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The first front for Russia’s new soft 
power ambition is domestic. Putin’s 
administration, represented by its 
deputy chief Vladislav Surkov, has been 
working on the development of 
‘sovereign democracy’
5 as a concept 
that should be the backbone of Russia’s 
‘national idea’. It is not easy to grasp 
what ‘sovereign democracy’ means 
exactly. The concept is deliberately 
vague, and the debate still ongoing.
6 
Nevertheless, this notion is centred 
around two core ideas. First is the idea 
of sovereignty. This concept is 
understood as non-interference from the 
West. The emphasis on ‘sovereign 
democracy’ is meant as a counter-
example to post-revolutionary Ukraine 
and Georgia, which in Moscow’s view 
are ruled from the outside. Second, is 
the idea that Russia has its own set of 
values. These values are democratic, but 
they emerge from Russia’s unique 
historical experience, and they are 
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distinct from what the West understands 
as democracy. Thus, Russia’s 
democracy should not necessarily 
correspond to Western standards of 
democracy. As Sergei Ivanov, Russia’s 
defence minister puts it, “if there is 
western democracy, there should be an 
eastern democracy as well”.
7 
On paper, the ideology of ‘sovereign 
democracy’ is presented as if it were not 
that different from what is understood 
in the West by democracy. But the 
reality is different. The rule of law, 
protection of minorities, a free press, a 
viable political opposition, or legally 
guaranteed property rights are not part 
of the reality of the ‘sovereign 
democracy’. From the jailing of 
Khodorkovsky, to the assassination of 
Politkovskaya, from the witch hunts 
against Georgians or North Caucasians 
(after Beslan), to problems with 
Western businesses over, for example, 
oil and gas development on Sakhalin 
Island, the actual functioning of this 
‘sovereign democracy’ raises many 
questions. Nikolai Petrov, a Russian 
expert, argues that sovereign democracy 
is “simply a new brand name for 
managed and centralised political 
development and can be considered to 
be the highest (and last?) stage of 
managed democracy”
8 Vladimir 
Ryzhkov, a Russian MP with liberal 
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views, states that “constitutional 
principle of the people as sovereign is 
being replaced by the unconstitutional 
notion of sovereign democracy. This 
term implies just the opposite of 
democracy. It means limiting 
democracy and political competition 
and indulging the ruling elite's desire to 
preserve its power by any means 
necessary”.
9 
The idea of ‘sovereign democracy’ has 
a number of functions. The first is to 
provide Putin’s authoritarianism with 
respectable ‘democratic’ clothes in 
order to strengthen it internally and 
insulate it from international criticism. 
The second is to challenge the West’s 
idea of democracy and human rights as 
a set of universal values and practices. 
As a result of the ‘colour revolutions’ in 
Ukraine and Georgia, Russia’s leaders 
learned that crude manipulation might 
not be enough to remain in power, that 
ideas matter and that NGOs can make 
revolutions. They have also learned that 
a ‘legitimacy deficit’ can undermine the 
elites. Thus the Kremlin had to develop 
its tools for ideological manipulation, 
enhance control of the circulation of 
ideas and the NGOs in a more pro-
active manner. Even the Russian 
Orthodox Church is involved in the 
project. The central question of a high-
profile and much-publicised congress of 
the Russian Church was: “Are Western 
standards of human happiness 
applicable to all countries and 
cultures?” The answer is a clear no. In 
the words of the Church’s main 
ideologue Miropolit Kiril, Russia 
should develop its own version of what 
human rights are and promote it 
internationally in order to oppose the 
West’s “dictatorial stance” that all other 
traditions “must be silenced and 
subdued.”
10  
A second front for Russia’s new 
ideological drive is external. Vitalii 
Tretyakov, a well-known Russian 
journalist close to the Kremlin, is blunt 
in stating that “Sovereign democracy is 
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the historical destiny of Russia… It is 
not only a positive fact but also a 
burden because under the wings of 
countries with maximum sovereignty, 
other countries and peoples are 
gathering. And we become responsible 
for them.”
11 Thus, Russia’s ‘sovereign 
democracy’ is not just about deflecting 
criticism from the West, but also about 
extending this ‘sovereignty’ to Russia’s 
neighbours. Nikolai Patrushev, Russia’s 
head of Federal Security Service (FSB) 
i s  e v e n  m o r e  o u t s p o k e n .  H e  s t a t e s :  
“Non-governmental organisations must 
not be allowed to engage in any activity 
they like…We are interested in unifying 
the respective laws of the Community 
of Independent States into clear 
legislation on the activity of NGOs. The 
NGOs must be told what problems they 
should tackle and for what purpose and 
they should engage in activity of that 
kind… The Constitution and laws must 
be changed before the wave of orange 
revolutions spread to the leaders of the 
Commonwealth of Independent 
States.”
12  
Russia’s way to consolidate its political 
regime and strengthen its dominance in 
its neighbours is increasingly creative 
and pro-active. Gas prices and trade 
embargoes are not the only tools to 
extend Russian influence. In Ivan 
Krastev words, the major objective of 
the Russian policy “is to develop an 
efficient infrastructure of ideas, 
institutions, networks and media outlets 
that can use the predictable crisis of the 
current orange-type regimes to regain 
influence not simply at the level of 
government but at the level of society as 
well. Russia will not fight democracy in 
these countries. Russia will fight for 
democracy – its kind of democracy.”
13  
Russia invests in the development of 
NGO infrastructure, and enhancing its 
channels to bring across the Kremlin’s 
message at all levels. Various Kremlin 
supported organisations are 
mushrooming. The scope of their 
activity is truly all-encompassing. 
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Russia-friendly and Russia-financed 
NGOs and think-tanks have emerged in 
many CIS states and even in the 
secessionist entities. For example, in 
Ukraine, Russian political technologists 
are busy advancing the idea of a 
‘sovereign Ukraine’,
14 which should not 
“sacrifice its long struggle for 
independence and national revival” and 
should not “give away its national 
sovereignty to the European 
bureaucracy”.
15 In the South Caucasus, 
a so-called ‘Caucasus Institute for 
Democracy’ with branches in Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia, as well as in 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia has 
been very active recently.
16 The 
institute organises regular roundtables, 
supports cultural activities, and has 
even launched a FM radio station in 
South Ossetia (Aizald-FM) and a 
newspaper in Abkhazia (Gudok-
Abkhazia). In Moldova, a Free Europe-
Moldova Foundation was created 
recently and its links to Russia have 
been obvious. The Russian authorities 
have been boosting a CIS election 
monitoring organisation (CIS-EMO) 
whose verdicts for elections conducted 
in the CIS have always been 
diametrically opposed to OSCE 
opinions on the elections.  
Inside Russia, these ‘soft power’ 
weapons are older and better developed. 
They comprise media outlets, youth 
movements, internet websites, expert 
networks (www.kreml.org), regular 
conferences and even publishing 
houses. It is not difficult to see that such 
outlets are part of the same network. 
They have links to each other, and the 
same faces, commentaries and ideas are 
simultaneously advanced by such 
outlets.  
They look like a network, but they are 
vertically integrated in a huge ‘public 
relations’ machine. They often lead to a 
restricted group of political 
technologists close to or inside the 
Kremlin, such as Gleb Pavlovski or 
Modest Kolerov. The latter is head of 
                                                  
14 See interview by Gleb Pavlosvki in 
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the directorate for interregional and 
cultural ties with foreign countries in 
the Presidential Administration of 
Russia which was created to coordinate 
this type of ‘soft power’ activities.
17 A 
typical example of how these networks 
reproduce themselves is the Evropa 
publishing house, which was co-
founded by the Russian Institute 
(www.russ.ru – a Pavlovski project), by 
Regnum.ru, a website set-up by 
Kolerov, and a respected economic 
journal  Ekspert. The same group also 
organised a series of conferences and 
seminars under the banner of a 
European Forum 
(www.europeforum.info). And the 
above-mentioned Caucasus Institute for 
Democracy publishes its books at the 
Evropa publishing house. One need not 
go far to see where the traces of 
‘independent’ outlets lead to. And that 
the heavy use of such words as 
democracy, Europe, freedom, etc. is 
simply an instance of ‘virtual politics’, 
designed to disguise a different 
reality.
18 
The challenge of these ‘soft power’ 
instruments is serious. Such enterprises 
are not Soviet-type propaganda. Nor are 
they true attempts to promote 
democracy and pluralism. They are 
designed to create an intellectual milieu 
of sophisticated, though tricked, 
ideological support for the current 
Russian authorities. They also serve as a 
source of ideology for the Kremlin’s 
pragmatists. The latter are driven by 
financial and power interests, not ideas 
or norms. But they seek to strengthen 
further their power by complementing it 
with a ‘soft’ dimension. It is the new 
face of ‘smart authoritarianism’ that 
speaks the language of Western norms 
and is very flexible, but has very little to 
do with the values of democracy, 
Eastern- or Western-style.  
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